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  Demands	   for	  explanation	  are	  often	  ambiguous,	  especially	   if	   the	  explanandum	   is	   such	  a	  multifaceted	  phenomenon	  as	  the	  success	  of	  science.	  It	  is	  therefore	  appropriate	  that	  John	  Wright	  opens	  his	  book	  by	  specifying	  what	  kinds	  of	  success	  it	  attempts	  to	  explain.	  In	  his	  view,	  the	  surprising	  thing	  about	  science	  is	  its	  novel	  predictive	  success:	  Scientific	  theories	  have	   led	   to	   correct	   predictions	   about	   phenomena	   which	   were	   unobserved	   or	   even	  observationally	  inaccessible	  at	  the	  time	  the	  theories	  were	  first	  advanced.	  Furthermore,	  some	  scientific	  theories	  were	  postulated	  on	  more	  or	  less	  a	  priori	  grounds,	  but	  turned	  out	  to	  make	  correct	  empirical	  predictions.	  It	  is	  this	  kind	  of	  success	  with	  which	  Wright’s	  book	  is	  concerned.	  But	  even	  if	   it	   is	  now	  clear	  what	  the	  explanandum	  is,	  opinion	  may	  still	  be	  divided	  as	  to	  what	  exactly	  it	  means	  to	  explain	  it.	  This	  becomes	  apparent	  in	  chapter	  2,	  where	  Wright	  critically	  discusses	  various	  explanations	  of	  science’s	  success	  which	  have	  been	  proposed	  in	   the	   literature.	   One	  way	   to	   interpret	   the	   demand	   for	   explanation	   is	   to	   assume	   that	  what	  is	  sought	  is	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  following	  question:	  (1) Why	  do	  our	  scientific	  theories	  tend	  to	  be	  successful?	  This	   question	   plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   debate	   on	   scientific	   realism.	   Broadly	  speaking,	   scientific	   realists	   reply	   to	   it	   by	   saying	   that	  our	   theories	   are	   (approximately)	  true,	  while	  antirealists	  have	  their	  different	  ways	  of	  denying	  this.	  Wright	  considers	  realist	  and	   antirealist	   approaches	   equally	   unsatisfactory,	   because	   they	   do	   not	   address	   a	  question	   which	   he	   thinks	   needs	   to	   be	   addressed	   if	   the	   success	   of	   science	   is	   to	   be	  explained,	  namely:	  (2) How	  did	  we	  manage	  to	  hit	  upon	  successful	  scientific	  theories?	  A	   satisfactory	   answer	   to	   that	   question	   should	   inform	   us	   about	   what	   Wright	   calls	  “property	  M”,	  that	  is,	  a	  feature	  by	  means	  of	  which	  we	  are	  able	  to	  identify	  theories	  that	  tend	  to	  be	  successful.	  Spelling	  out	  what	  property	  M	  consists	   in	  will	  be	  one	  of	  the	  main	  tasks	  of	  later	  chapters,	  but	  at	  this	  point,	  all	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  said	  about	  M	  is	  that	  it	  must	  be	  accessible	  in	  the	  following	  sense:	  It	  must	  be	  easier	  for	  us	  to	  tell	  whether	  some	  theory	  has	  M	  than	  it	  is	  to	  tell	  whether	  it	  will	  tend	  to	  be	  successful.	  This	  immediately	  shows	  that	  the	  realist’s	  notion	  of	  approximate	  truth	  does	  not	  qualify	  as	  a	  candidate	  for	  M.	  The	  task	  of	  explaining	  science’s	  success	  can	  then	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  task	  of	  explicating	  M	  and	  providing	  answers	  to	  the	  following	  two	  questions:	  (3) Why	  do	  we	  prefer	  M-­‐theories?	  (4) Why	  do	  M-­‐theories	  tend	  to	  be	  successful?	  Wright	   now	   claims	   that	   previous	   attempts	   to	   explain	   science’s	   success	   manage	   to	  answer	   only	   either	   (3)	   or	   (4),	   but	   not	   both.	   And	   if	   some	   combination	   of	   strategies	   is	  employed,	  he	  still	   takes	   the	  resulting	  explanation	   to	  be	  unsatisfactory,	  because	   it	  does	  not	  explain	  why	  the	  type	  of	  theory	  we	  prefer	  also	  happens	  to	  be	  the	  one	  that	  tends	  to	  be	  successful.	   Many	   adherents	   of	   the	   views	   criticized	   in	   this	   chapter	   will	   protest	   that	  
Wright	   here	   only	   targets	   overly	   simplistic	   versions	   of	   their	   approaches,	   but	   this	   is	  perhaps	  inevitable	  if	  one	  tries	  to	  address	  such	  a	  variety	  of	  views	  in	  just	  one	  chapter.	  A	  more	  serious	  objection	  is	  that,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  below,	  the	  basic	  criticism	  Wright	  advances	  against	  extant	  views	  also	  applies	  to	  his	  own	  approach.	  The	  central	  chapters	  3	  to	  5	  are	  dedicated	  to	  developing	  this	  approach.	  The	  central	  idea	  is	  that	   any	   reasonable	   explication	   of	   property	   M	   must	   somehow	   capture	   what	   we	  intuitively	  call	  a	  theory’s	  simplicity	  or	  lack	  of	  ad	  hocness.	  Wright	  proposes	  a	  definition	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  “the	  independence	  of	  theory	  from	  data”	  to	  achieve	  this	  aim.	  Very	  roughly,	  the	   independence	   of	   a	   theory	   T	   is	   defined	   as	   the	   ratio	   between	   the	   amount	   of	  (previously	   obtained)	   data	   which	   T	   can	   explain	   and	   the	   number	   of	   explanatory	  components	   which	   T	   needs	   to	   postulate	   in	   order	   to	   do	   this	   job.	   As	   an	   illustrative	  example,	  one	  may	  think	  of	  the	  epicycles	  postulated	  by	  the	  ptolemaic	  system	  in	  order	  to	  account	   for	   the	   astronomical	   data.	   Such	   postulates	   increase	   the	   number	   of	   a	   theory’s	  data-­‐dependent	   explanatory	   components	   and	   therefore	   reduce	   its	   independence	   from	  the	  data,	  thus	  rendering	  the	  theory	  increasingly	  ad	  hoc.	  Now	  Wright	  does	  not	  equate	  this	  notion	  of	  independence	  with	  the	  sought-­‐after	  property	  M,	  but	  introduces	  some	  other	  success-­‐conducive	  properties,	  which	  are,	  however,	  closely	  related	   to	   the	   independence	   property	   just	   discussed.	   What	   results	   is	   an	   interrelated	  cluster	  of	  properties,	  which,	  according	  to	  Wright,	  constitutes	  property	  M.	  In	  chapters	  6	  to	  8,	  he	  applies	  these	  concepts	  to	  three	  historical	  cases	  (Newtonian	  mechanics,	  special	  relativity,	   and	  Mendelian	   genetics),	   attempting	   to	   show	   that	   his	   approach	   can	   indeed	  explain	  the	  impressive	  empirical	  success	  of	  these	  theories.	  Much	   of	  what	  Wright	   has	   to	   say	   on	   these	   issues	   is	   formulated	  with	   great	   clarity	   and	  supported	  by	  well-­‐developed	  arguments,	  and	  the	  historical	  case	  studies	  provide	  helpful	  illustration.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  also	  see	  some	  rather	  serious	  flaws	  in	  his	  approach,	  which	  I	  will	  address	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  review.	  One	  problem	  concerns	  the	  counting	  of	  explanatory	  components,	  which	   is	  presupposed	  in	  Wright’s	  definition	  of	  independence.	  Clearly,	  if	  we	  place	  no	  restriction	  on	  the	  language	  in	   which	   a	   theory	   is	   formulated,	   even	   the	   most	   contrived	   theory,	   consisting	   of	   a	  multitude	   of	   ad	   hoc	   postulates,	   could	   be	   made	   to	   look	   as	   if	   it	   contained	   just	   one	  explanatory	   component,	   expressed	  by	   a	   suitably	   defined	  disjunctive	  predicate.	  Wright	  (pp.	   72-­‐79;	   85-­‐86)	   therefore	   insists	   that	   theories	   must	   be	   couched	   in	   “basic	   natural	  predicates”,	  and	  he	  admits	  that	  this	  threatens	  the	  epistemic	  accessibility	  of	  his	  proposed	  property	  M,	  because	   it	  may	  not	  be	  obvious	  which	  predicates	  are	   to	  count	  as	  “natural”.	  His	  reply	  to	  this	  worry	  appeals	  to	  David	  Lewis’s	  (1983)	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	   reference	   relation	   to	  prefer	  natural	  predicates	   to	  non-­‐natural	   ones.	   It	   is,	   however,	  unclear	  how	  this	  is	  supposed	  to	  help	  with	  the	  epistemic	  problem,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  an	  example	  which	  Wright	  himself	   introduces	   (p.	   78):	  Prima	   facie,	   “carbon”	  does	  not	   look	  like	  a	  natural	  predicate,	  as	  it	  applies	  to	  such	  observationally	  different	  objects	  as	  lumps	  of	  coal	  and	  diamonds.	  But	  of	  course,	  it	  is	  natural	  to	  group	  these	  things	  together,	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  chemical	  elements	  they	  consist	  of.	  This	  shows	  that	  assessments	  of	  naturalness	  need	  to	  be	  theoretically	  informed;	  what	  we	  count	  as	  basic	  natural	  predicates	  partly	  depends	  on	  the	  theories	  we	  have	  accepted	  (modern	  chemistry	  in	  this	  case).	  But	  if	  such	  a	  theory-­‐dependent	  notion	  plays	  an	  essential	  role	   in	  Wright’s	  proposal	   to	  explicate	  property	  M,	  that	  property’s	  role	  in	  theory	  choice	  becomes	  obscure.	  It	  seems	  that	  we	  already	  need	  to	  decide	   whether	   or	   not	   to	   accept	   a	   theory	   before	   we	   can	   evaluate	   to	   what	   degree	   it	  possesses	  property	  M.	  
No	  one	  denies	   that	   the	   lack	   of	   ad	   hocness,	  which	  Wright’s	   property	  M	   is	   supposed	   to	  capture,	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  theory	  choice,	  but	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  his	  approach	  predominantly	  addresses	  cases	  of	  theory	  choice	  of	  a	  rather	  trivial	  sort.	  For	  example,	  he	  extensively	   discusses	   (pp.	   100-­‐105;	   117-­‐120)	  why	  we	  prefer	   laws	   according	   to	  which	  some	   physical	   quantities	   are	   exactly	   conserved,	   as	   opposed	   to	   laws	   postulating	   small	  changes	  in	  those	  quantities,	  although	  both	  types	  of	  laws	  would	  be	  compatible	  with	  our	  previous	   experience.	   Or	   he	   attempts	   to	   justify	   (pp.	   105-­‐106)	   the	   appearance	   of	   the	  exponent	  2,	  rather	  than,	  say,	  2.01,	  in	  Coulomb’s	  law,	  although	  both	  options	  would	  have	  been	  compatible	  with	  the	  data	  available	  at	  Coulomb’s	  time.	  But	  these	  are	  hardly	  cases	  of	  underdetermination	  which	  we	  would	  consider	  as	   scientifically	   interesting.	   I	   grant	   that	  Wright’s	  approach	  has	  the	  virtue	  of	  explaining	  why	  we	  consider	  these	  cases	  trivial	  and	  why	  we	  do	  not	  lie	  awake	  at	  night	  pondering	  why	  Coulomb	  put	  “2”	  rather	  than	  “2.01”	  in	  his	  formula,	  but	  then	  again,	  this	  phenomenon	  may	  not	  seem	  surprising	  enough	  to	  call	  for	  an	  explanation.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  non-­‐trivial	  cases	  of	  underdetermination,	  Wright	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  much	  to	  say.	  For	  example,	   the	  chapter	  on	  special	  relativity	  does	  not	  mention	  the	  most	  serious	  early	  alternative	  to	  Einstein’s	  theory,	  namely	  Lorentz’s	  ether	  theory.	  This	   is	  all	  the	   more	   surprising,	   because	   the	   FitzGerald-­‐Lorentz	   contraction	   hypothesis	  incorporated	   in	   Lorentz’s	   theory	   is	   generally	   viewed	   as	   a	   paradigm	   case	   of	   an	   ad	   hoc	  hypothesis,	  which	  would	  make	  it	  an	  ideal	  test	  case	  to	  see	  whether	  Wright’s	  account	  of	  ad	  hocness	  (or	  lack	  thereof)	  can	  explain	  why	  Einstein’s	  theory	  was	  preferred	  to	  Lorentz’s.	  Christopher	  Hunt	  (2012)	  has	  recently	  reviewed	  different	  attempts	  at	  characterizing	  ad	  hocness	   in	   the	   literature,	   and	   concluded	   that	   the	   concept	   is	  useless	   for	  understanding	  relevant	   cases	  of	   theory	   choice	   (such	  as	   the	  Einstein-­‐Lorentz	   case).	   I	   suspect	   that	   this	  negative	  judgment	  also	  applies	  to	  Wright’s	  account,	  because	  I	  do	  not	  see	  how	  Wright’s	  account	   is	   supposed	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   earlier	   proposals	   discussed	   by	   Hunt.	   Here,	  Wright’s	   study	   could	   have	   profited	   from	   a	   critical	   engagement	  with	   his	   predecessors,	  such	  as	  Popper,	  Grünbaum,	  or	  Leplin.	  Hunt’s	  (2012,	  p.	  6)	  paper	  also	  raises	  an	  interesting	  question	  regarding	  another	  historical	  example	  Wright	  (pp.	  136-­‐138)	  discusses:	  the	  prediction	  (made	  by	  Adams	  and	  LeVerrier	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Newton’s	  theory	  of	  gravity)	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  planet	  Neptune.	  Let	  us	  assume	  that,	  as	  Wright	  claims,	  his	  account	  can	  explain	  the	  success	  of	  this	  prediction.	  Is	  it	  then	  not	  somewhat	  surprising	   that	  LeVerrier	  a	   few	  years	   later,	  using	  exactly	   the	  same	  type	   of	   reasoning,	   arrived	   at	   a	   spectacularly	   unsuccessful	   prediction,	   namely	   the	  existence	  of	  the	  planet	  “Vulcan”,	  supposedly	  responsible	  for	  the	  observed	  deviations	  in	  Mercury’s	  orbit	  (which	  really	  are	  effects	  of	  general	  relativity)?	  This	  brings	  me	  to	  my	  final	  (and	  probably	  most	  fundamental)	  point	  of	  criticism.	  Wright	  has	  a	  response	  to	  my	  rhetorical	  question	  in	  the	  previous	  paragraph,	  namely	  that	  he	  only	  aspires	  to	  give	  a	  probabilistic	  explanation	  of	  science’s	  success,	  and	  it	   is	  not	  part	  of	  this	  notion	  of	  explanation	  that	  the	  explanandum	  is	  to	  be	  expected,	  given	  the	  explanation	  (p.	  55).	  In	  other	  words,	  having	  a	  probabilistic	  explanation	  of	  LeVerrier’s	  success	  concerning	  Neptune	   is	   compatible	   with	   acknowledging	   his	   failure	   concerning	   Vulcan.	   My	  fundamental	   disagreement	   with	   Wright	   is	   that	   I	   do	   not	   consider	   this	   notion	   of	  explanation	   sufficient	   for	   giving	   a	   satisfactory	   answer	   to	   both	   questions	   (3)	   and	   (4)	  mentioned	  above.	  Notice	  first	  that,	  by	  Wright’s	  own	  admission	  (pp.	  83-­‐84),	  probabilities	  by	  themselves	  do	  not	  explain	  anything.	  What	  plays	  the	  explanatory	  role	  is	  a	  propensity	  that	  underlies	  the	  probabilities.	   I	   am	   not	   here	   concerned	   with	   general	   metaphysical	   objections	   to	  
propensities.1	   What	   worries	   me	   is	   that	   the	   propensities	   postulated	   by	   Wright’s	  explanation	   are	   of	   a	   rather	   peculiar	   kind.	   To	   see	   this,	   it	   is	   instructive	   to	   look	   at	   how	  Wright	  introduces	  them.	  He	  starts	  with	  a	  case	  in	  which	  I	  take	  the	  appeal	  to	  propensities	  to	  be	  unproblematic,	  namely	  enumerative	  induction	  about	  concrete	  objects	  (pp.	  43-­‐56).	  Having	  observed	  a	  large	  number	  of	  crows	  and	  having	  found	  that	  they	  are	  all	  black,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  infer	  that	  crows	  have	  a	  propensity	  to	  be	  black,	  which	  in	  turn	  licenses	  the	  inference	  that	  the	  next	  crows	  to	  be	  observed	  will	  be	  black	  as	  well.	  But	  even	  in	  this	  case,	  not	  every	  appeal	  to	  propensities	  is	  equally	  well	  justified.	  As	  Wright	  himself	  observes	  (p.	  53),	  even	  if	  we	  had	  never	  seen	  any	  black	  things	  that	  were	  not	  crows,	  the	  observation	  of	  many	  black	  crows	  would	  not	  license	  the	  inference	  that	  black	  things	  have	  a	  propensity	  to	  be	  crows.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  asymmetry	  is	  that	  an	  object’s	  being	  a	  crow	  plausibly	  has	  a	  causal	   influence	   on	   its	   being	   black,	   but	   not	   vice	   versa	   (p.	   190n8).	   So	  whether	   or	   not	  claims	   about	   propensities	   are	   justified	   depends	   on	   the	   causal	   structure	   of	   the	   world.	  Now	   let	   us	   turn	   to	   the	   kind	   of	   propensity	   used	   in	   Wright’s	   explanation	   of	   science’s	  success	  (pp.	  66-­‐70).	  This	  is	  a	  propensity	  of	  some	  data	  to	  exemplify	  a	  certain	  theory.	  I	  find	  the	  analogy	  between	  data	  and	  concrete	  objects	  like	  crows	  difficult	  to	  grasp.	  In	  particular,	  nothing	  in	  my	  causal	  background	  knowledge	  tells	  me	  whether	  I	  should	  think	  of	  data	  as	  analogous	   to	   crows	   (which	   have	   a	   propensity	   to	   be	   black),	   rather	   than	   analogous	   to	  black	  things	  (which	  do	  not	  have	  a	  propensity	  to	  be	  crows).	  But	  even	   if	  we	  accept	   the	  existence	  of	   the	  propensity	  which	  Wright	  attributes	   to	  data,	  and	   further	   accept	   that	   this	   propensity	   is,	   as	   he	   claims,	   conferred	   on	   the	   data	   by	   the	  corresponding	   theory’s	  having	  property	  M,	   I	   doubt	   that	  he	  has	   given	  us	   a	   satisfactory	  explanation	  of	  science’s	  success.	  For	  the	  statement	  just	  given	  is	  obviously	  not	  an	  answer	  to	  question	  (4),	  but	  a	  restatement	  of	  the	  explanandum	  contained	  in	  (4);	  to	  say	  that	  the	  propensity	   of	   the	   data	   to	   exemplify	   an	  M-­‐theory	   explains	   the	   M-­‐theory’s	   tendency	   to	  successfully	   predict	   the	   data	   is	   like	   saying	   that	   Djokovic’s	   defeat	   explains	   Murray’s	  victory	  in	  the	  2013	  Wimbledon	  final.	  Wright	  might	  again	  reply	  that	  I	  have	  mischaracterized	  what	  a	  probabilistic	  explanation	  is	   supposed	   to	   do.	   According	   to	   Salmon’s	   (1971)	   statistical	   relevance	   (SR)	   model	   of	  explanation,	  an	  explanation	  just	  needs	  to	  state	  the	  facts	  which	  are	  statistically	  relevant	  to	  the	  explanandum,	  and	  Wright’s	  account	  does	  this	  by	  stating	  that	  a	  theory’s	  possessing	  property	  M	  is	  statistically	  relevant	  to	  a	  theory’s	  success.	  In	  his	  concluding	  remarks	  (pp.	  180-­‐184),	  Wright	   admits	   that	   we	  may	   very	   well	   ask	   for	   more	   and	   thereby	   enter	   the	  debate	  on	  scientific	  realism,	  but	  he	  seems	  to	   think	   that	  his	  SR	  explanation	  of	  science’s	  success	  will	  be	  untouched	  by	  the	  outcome	  of	  that	  debate.	  However,	  this	  may	  not	  be	  so:	  If	  scientific	  realism	  is	  true,	  then,	  plausibly,	  both	  a	  theory’s	  possessing	  property	  M	  and	   its	  empirical	   success	   will	   be	   consequences	   of	   the	   theory’s	   approximate	   truth.	   Put	   in	  statistical	   terms,	   approximate	   truth	   will	   screen	   off	   property	   M	   from	   success,	   just	   as	  atmospheric	   pressure	   screens	   off	   the	   barometer	   reading	   from	   the	   occurrence	   of	   the	  storm	   in	   the	   famous	   example	   discussed	   in	   Salmon	   (1971,	   pp.	   53-­‐55).	   In	   other	  words,	  approximate	  truth	  renders	  property	  M	  statistically	  irrelevant	  to	  a	  theory’s	  success.	  But	  if	  that	   is	   the	   case,	   then	  Wright’s	   explanation	   of	   science’s	   success	   fails,	   even	   in	   the	  weak	  sense	  of	  the	  SR	  model.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Let	  me	  note	  in	  passing	  that	  Wright’s	  commitment	  to	  propensities	  may	  well	  undermine	  his	  claim	  (p.	  180)	  that	  his	  explanation	  does	  not	  “appeal	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  any	  theoretical	  entities”.	  
These	  critical	  remarks	  about	  Wright’s	  reply	  to	  question	  (4)	  should	  not	  distract	  from	  the	  fact	   that	   his	   discussion	  provides	   a	  well-­‐argued	   reply	   to	   question	   (3)	   and	   thereby	   also	  offers	   valuable	   insight	   regarding	  question	   (2).	  To	   everyone	  who	   is	   interested	   in	   these	  questions,	  the	  book	  is	  warmly	  recommended.	  	  
References	  Hunt,	  J.	  C.	  (2012).	  “On	  Ad	  Hoc	  Hypotheses”.	  Philosophy	  of	  Science	  79,	  1-­‐14.	  Lewis,	   D.	   (1983).	   “New	   Work	   for	   a	   Theory	   of	   Universals”.	   Australasian	   Journal	   of	  
Philosophy	  61,	  343-­‐377.	  Salmon,	   W.	   (ed.)	   (1971).	   Statistical	   Explanation	   and	   Statistical	   Relevance.	   Pittsburgh:	  University	  of	  Pittsburgh	  Press.	  	  Matthias	  Egg,	  University	  of	  Lausanne	  matthias.egg@unil.ch	  
